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Abstract: 
  
The EU Referendum in the UK on 23 June laid bare long existing divisions in the 
country. Throughout the campaign, the leave side diverted their discontent to a scapegoat 
of immigration and fuelled xenophobia. While there is consensus that the result is linked to 
inequality, the impact of migration on inequality is contested. Our recent research shows 
that inequality in the UK increased not because of migration, i.e. the mobility of labour, but 
because of the increased fallback options of capital related to increased capital mobility in 
the form of FDI  and financialisation; declining fallback options of labour related to the 
decline in collective bargaining power, deregulation of the labour market, zero hours 
contracts and false self-employed contracts, austerity, housing crisis and rising household 
debt, which itself is linked to financialisation and inequality. The irony is that in fact, 
migration does not have a negative impact on the share of wages in total income and real 
wages even in the service sectors predominantly hiring low-skilled labour, which also 
employ a large share of migrants. The quick conclusions related to the impact of 
immigration on inequality, without adequately decomposing the impact of all other factors, 
misses the point that correlation is not causation. The real solution to inequality requires 
regulating finance and the corporate governance of corporations, taming capital mobility, 
increasing public investment in social infrastructure and housing, regulating the labour 
market and improving the legislation to increase the voice of trade unions and collective 
bargaining coverage. In an alternative economy where the balance of power shifts in favour 
of labour and unions have a strong voice, if migrants come to work, it is possible to set the 
terms and conditions under which they work by the local workforce. Conversely, in the 
current situation where the bargaining power of workers has been dramatically eroded 
with respect to capital, high capital mobility and low wages elsewhere in Eastern Europe 
and the world will mean the firms will relocate or offshore parts of their production 
abroad, even if migration can be  limited after Brexit. 
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Rising inequality in the UK and the political economy of Brexit: 
lessons for policy 
The EU Referendum in the UK on 23 June laid bare long existing divisions in the country. A 
very divisive campaign for leave deepened the scars in the society further. After decades of 
deindustrialization, rising inequality, deteriorating working conditions, loss of voice, followed by 
the Great Recession and austerity, the majority of the working people felt the only way to 
express their discontent about their living and working conditions is to vote to leave. Throughout 
the campaign, the leave side diverted their discontent to a scapegoat of immigration and fuelled 
xenophobia. Various Brexit campaigns created an illusion that conditions can only improve if 
Britain takes control of its borders, which they claimed to be impossible as a member of the 
European Union. According to survey evidence fears of immigration are more pronounced 
among voters in a more vulnerable position in the labour market, and in the post-industrial north-
eastern towns, with also a clear divide between generations, with around two-thirds of the over 
55s voting to leave and 70 per cent of the under 25s voting to stay (Hobolt, 2016; Ashcroft, 
2016; Burn-Murdoch, 2016). The disenfranchised communities did not feel that they have 
anything more to lose due to the economic risks of Brexit or loss of workers’ rights under a 
conservative exit scenario, which sadly is likely to prove wrong.   
Since the referendum, there is an increase in reports from think tanks and investment 
funds that link the result to inequality and globalisation (e.g. Resolution Foundation; Pimco; 
Bank of America; Hermes; Standard Life, reported by Allen, 2016 and Farrell, 2016). 
Globalisation of markets for goods, services, capital and labour is seen to reduce some workers’ 
wages through placing them in direct competition with workers from across the world, and to 
create winners and losers. There is increasing concern that this will lead to political backlash and 
protectionism as eventually losers cast their vote. 
The elephant in the room is the actual causes of rising inequality: Our recent research 
shows that inequality in the UK increased not because of migration, i.e. the mobility of labour, 
but because of the increased fallback options of capital related to increased capital mobility in 
the form of FDI  and financialisation; declining fallback options of labour related to the decline 
in collective bargaining power, deregulation of the labour market, zero hours contracts and false 
self-employed contracts, austerity, housing crisis and rising household debt, which itself is linked 
to financialisation and inequality (Guschanski and Onaran, 2016, forthcoming). As our data 
shows this is not a new phenomenon but a process that gained momentum since the 1980s, when 
increased globalisation and Thatcherism initiated a poisonous mix of austerity, deregulation of 
product and labour markets and slashing of workers’ rights. The irony is that in fact, according to 
our research results migration does not have a negative impact on either the share of wages in 
total income or real wages even in the service sectors predominantly hiring low-skilled labour, 
which also employ a large share of migrants, as we discuss in more detail below. The quick 
conclusions related to the impact of immigration on inequality, without adequately decomposing 
the impact of all other factors, misses the point that correlation is not causation. The 
simultaneous rise in immigration and inequality does not mean that the former causes the latter. 
This debate on migration based on myths also misses how migrants contribute to overcoming the 
care deficit in an ageing society, an especially striking fact given that a majority of voters over 
65 years voted to leave (Ashcroft, 2016), and that migrants are net contributors to the social 
security system.   
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Migrants are visible to the people, but what firms and financial firms in the City and 
offshore tax havens do is less visible and comprehensible. The real solution to inequality requires 
regulating finance and the corporate governance of corporations, taming capital mobility, 
increasing public investment in social infrastructure and housing, regulating the labour market 
and improving the legislation to increase the voice of trade unions and collective bargaining 
coverage. In an alternative economy where the balance of power shifts in favour of labour and 
unions have a strong voice, if migrants come to work, it is possible to set the terms and 
conditions under which they work by the local workforce. Conversely, in the current situation 
where the bargaining power of workers has been dramatically eroded with respect to capital, 
high capital mobility and low wages elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the world will mean the 
firms will relocate or offshore parts of their production abroad, even if migration can be  limited 
after Brexit. If migrants will not be allowed to come, firms will go to where they are, and it is a 
lot harder to set the conditions of work abroad to avoid a global race to the bottom in wages.   
In the following, we summarise our econometric analysis about the causes of the rise in 
inequality and the fall in the wage share (labour compensation as a ratio to value added) in the 
UK using sectoral data with country specific estimations (Guschanski and Onaran, 2016, 
forthcoming). We analyse the effects separately in manufacturing and service industries, and also 
distinguish between sectors using predominantly high and low-skilled labour. Our research also 
covers other selected OECD countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden, the US).   
 
What happened to working peoples’ share in income in the UK? 
 
There has been a significant decline in the share of wages in GDP in the UK since the 1980s. 
This was accompanied by another trend towards greater inequality in personal income 
distribution, particularly by increases in income shares of the top 1% of the distribution. Figure 1 
shows the wage share in different sectors. In the UK services sectors using predominantly low-
skilled labour, the wage share experienced a steady reduction since the mid-1990s and is 5 
percentage-points lower in 2009 than it was in 1981. Labour in the low-skilled manufacturing 
sectors has also lost out in relation to its position in the early 1980s by 4 percentage-points in 
2009. Turning to high-skilled sectors, wage share in services experienced a sharp decline by 9 
percentage-points between 1984 and 1994 and afterwards stabilised at a lower level. The wage 
share in high-skilled manufacturing is highly volatile and, at 71 percent in 2009, it is 10 
percentage-points lower than its peak in 1981, and close to its lowest level of 67 percent in 1996. 
The role of the Great Recession  
The rise in inequality and stagnation in wages have been two of the fundamental flaws in our 
economic model, which have been at the root of the Great Recession, and we are far from 
correcting this imbalance. Historically, the wage share tends to rise during recessions as 
companies hold on to workers and productivity falls more than real wages, and then the wage 
share falls during the recovery. But during the 2008 recession and its aftermath the labour share 
did the opposite: it fell soon after the initial year of the recession, and when the recovery began 
the aggregate wage share kept falling. Real pay is still about 9% lower compared to its peak in 
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early 2008. After the longest and most dramatic period of decline in real wages since the 
Victorian times, waged and salaried people in Britain may be once again under pressure due to 
the uncertainty and a potential recession after Brexit. The share of wages in UK GDP fell from 
67.7% in 2007 to 65.8% in 2015. This two percentage-point fall in labour’s share in income 
comes on top of a three-decade long fall in the share of wages from its peak of 76.2% in 1975. 
Institutional and economic changes that impacted the position of labour 
While the Brexit campaign was largely dominated by an anti-migrant rhetoric, our estimations 
show that it actually has a positive effect on the wage share in Britain, while other factors explain 
the rise in inequality, with the destruction of collective bargaining institutions, globalisation and 
financialisation at the forefront. Table 1 and 2 in the Appendix summarises the estimation results 
for the wage share, and real wage (labour compensation as a ratio to people engaged).  
Fall in the bargaining power of workers 
We observe a strong decline in union density for all industries in the UK as can be seen in Figure 
2. While this is a general trend in all countries, the fall has been strongest in the UK starting from 
the 1980s after the Thatcherite policies. Union density is highest in manufacturing sectors and 
lowest in low-skilled service sectors. Union density in aggregate in the UK decreased by 24.4 
percentage points from 49.9% in 1981 to 25.4% in 2013. Similarly, collective bargaining 
coverage has seen the strongest decline in the UK, from its peak of 80% in 1979 to 31.2% in 
2011.  
Our results show that there is a robust and strong positive effect of collective bargaining 
coverage as well as union density on the wage share in the UK which is clearly driven by high 
and low-skilled manufacturing sectors.
1
  
Additionally, our results show that social government spending (in health, education, 
social care) has a strong positive impact on the wage share, pointing towards the negative 
consequences of austerity policies and decreasing fallback options of labour.   
We also find a negative impact of personal income inequality on the wage share in the 
UK. The rise in personal income inequality, in particular, the income share of the top percentile 
reflects the impact of political capture and the control over resources by a narrow elite circle.  
Financialisation  
Financial activities and the prominence of financial institutions gained momentum since the 
1980s. Similar to globalisation, this process of financialisation has increased the fallback options 
for capital which can now be more easily invested in various financial assets.  Furthermore, 
                                                        
1
 We experimented with a measure of sectoral level union density but fail to find a robust positive effect. A 
similar observation is made for France and the US. It is interesting to note that these three countries are 
characterised by a (relatively) low level of bargaining coordination and union density and higher level of bargaining 
coverage. 
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financialisation changed industrial relations and led to a ‘shareholder value orientation’ as a 
consequence of hostile takeovers of listed companies. Financialised firms adopt a ‘downsize and 
distribute’ strategy, which reduces prospects for labour to agree on a beneficial compromise. 
Financialisation, coupled by rising inequality and house price bubbles, has also had important 
impacts on households, above all through a remarkable rise in household debt.  
In the UK, we find a robust negative effect of household debt and financial payments of 
non-financial corporations (dividends and interest) on the wage share in both manufacturing and 
service sectors alike.
2
 This finding complements recent research that finds a negative impact of 
financialisation on investment of non-financial companies (Tori and Onaran, 2015). Financial 
income of non-financial corporations, on the other hand, has a positive impact in some 
specifications. 
Globalisation 
The broad trend of globalisation has brought with it increased options for firms to relocate to 
other countries or register their status offshore. Furthermore, the terrain on which trade unions 
must confront firms has changed dramatically over the last two decades as a result of changes in 
the way production is organised. Rather than concentrating activities under a single roof, and 
maintaining tight control over the whole production process, firms can now coordinate their 
activities in increasingly complex and dispersed ways, involving outsourcing, networked 
collaborations and market-based transactions. The increasing prominence of multinational 
companies that are structured in this way exerts further negative pressure on workers’ bargaining 
power, for instance through the increasing use of relocation threat to gain concessions in 
negotiations.  
While we find that globalisation measured as intermediate imports (as a ratio to domestic 
demand) and outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI, as a ratio to the number of employees) 
had a strong impact on the wage share in all countries, the effects are less strong in the UK than 
in continental Europe. In the UK there is some evidence for a negative effect of outward FDI on 
the wage share driven by manufacturing and service sectors alike.
3
 There is also some evidence 
of a negative effect of intermediate imports (international outsourcing) in manufacturing, but the 
effect is rarely statistically significant. 
Migration 
The impact of labour migration on the wages is theoretically ambiguous. It depends on whether 
migrant labour substitutes the domestic workers and pushes down wages, or acts as a 
complement to labour being performed locally, rather than a direct competitor. The channels 
                                                        
2
 Household debt appears to have a positive effect on wages as opposed to its negative effect on the wage 
share. However, given that lending to lower income households was much less aggressive in the UK than in the US, 
this finding most probably reflects the fact that low-income households are credit constrained. 
3
Outward FDI has a positive impact on average wages, but the negative impact on the wage share indicates 
that the wage increases fall behind the rise in productivity. 
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through which migration affects wages could, very broadly, be differentiated between the impact 
of migration on productivity and employment. Previous research has shown that migration is 
related to increased innovation, measured by the registration of patents, and is therefore 
positively linked to productivity in the UK, and that migrants to the UK are higher educated than 
the average British worker (Rolfe, et al. 2013; Saleheen, and Shadforth, 2006). Depending on the 
nature of the technological advancement and the bargaining power of labour this could lead to an 
increase in both wages and the wage share. Furthermore, migrants might increase the overall 
skill level of the workforce and thereby facilitate tasks or open up new business areas. Turning to 
the effect on employment, technological advancement and new business opportunities might also 
increase labour demand for domestic workers. Furthermore, migrants often bring in knowledge 
about markets and economies of their home countries and therefore open the possibility for 
expansion of the business activities via new export markets, which might have a positive impact 
on the wage share (Huber, et al. 2010; Rolfe, et al. 2013). Even migrants with low skills do not 
always substitute domestic labour, if their labour supply as well as demand is increasing the 
overall demand for labour in the economy.  
 The share of foreign workforce (by nationality) in total workforce increased from 2.8% in 
1984 to 7.6% in 2010. Interestingly, we find a very robust positive impact of migration (the share 
of foreign workforce (by nationality) in total workforce) on the wage share as well as real wages 
in both manufacturing and service sectors alike. Most importantly, contrary to political 
propaganda from several parties prior to the Brexit debate, the impact is especially significant 
and positive in the low-skilled service sectors, again on both wages and the wage share.  Despite 
the evidence in Rolfe, et al. (2013) regarding the positive impact of migration on productivity in 
the UK, it is interesting that the increase in wages seems to be strong enough to more than offset 
the impact of migration productivity and lead to a rise in the wage share as well.  Obviously, 
there is need for more research on the reasons why increased immigration is associated with a 
higher wage rate as well as the impact of migration on different types of native workers, not just 
using sectoral average wage data but also individual household labour force survey data. We 
would rather not derive too strong conclusions regarding the positive impact of migration on 
wages in particular; however on a cautious note evidence based on our results as well as the 
literature indicate that  more migration need not lead to lower wages, lower wage share and 
worse working conditions if unions and regulations are strong. 
Technology 
The share of ICT (information and communication technology) capital services in value added is 
usually applied as a measure of technological change in the literature. We observe a steady 
increase in the share of ICT capital services measures across all sectors. However, we do not find 
a significant negative effect of ICT or non-ICT capital services on the wage share in the UK, 
when other factors mentioned above are controlled for. Hence, technological change has not 
been the main driver of rising inequality in the UK. However, there is some evidence of a 
negative effect on average wages. 
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Lessons for policy in the UK and Europe 
Since the 1980s, and in a more accelerated way after the Great Recession, the UK has been the 
leader of damaging austerity, low-wage and precarious employment practices in the name of 
flexibility, and financialisation.  
It is, however, also true that despite the rights secured by the European trade union 
movement in the last decades, the labour market policies in the EU Member States (MS) have 
been far from rosy (Onaran, 2016). Individual EU MS and the European Commission (EC) have 
long encouraged wage moderation, explicitly recommending real wage growth below 
productivity growth to increase the international competitiveness of the countries. Furthermore, 
there is still much to do in tackling the political impact of rising inequality, and the policy flaws 
and democratic deficit in the EU institutions. However, let us be clear: these policies have not 
been imposed on the UK by the EC; the UK has been the leader of anti-labour low road labour 
market policies, and used globalisation as a pretext to implement them and to claim that there is 
no alternative.   
Progressive movements and trade unions in the UK should now work to lead high road 
labour market policies and a wage-led recovery and improve cooperation with pro-labour forces 
in Europe.    
We have strong empirical evidence to reject the myth that we cannot have pro-labour 
policies in the age of globalisation. Both the UK and Europe as a whole is strong enough to 
pursue an egalitarian, wage-led growth strategy and would benefit from a coordinated boost to 
the wage share. As such, the UK and other progressives in Europe could, and should, take a step 
forward in terms of radically reversing the fall in the wage share globally.   
Negative effects of openness or global integration are not an unavoidable destiny, rather 
an outcome of the current domestic and international policies. Openness and regional integration 
can also be managed in a way to benefit both the richer and poorer partners if trade and 
investment flows are designed as part of an egalitarian and growth-oriented international 
economic policy. In the European context, labour movements have more common ground than 
they currently exploit. There is scope for international cooperation, in case the coordination 
failure can be overcome.   
The fall in the wage share has been a deliberate outcome of policies that led to the fall in 
the bargaining power of labour, welfare state retrenchment, and financialisation.  The 
combination of these policies has led to the vicious circle of rising inequality, financialisation, 
chronically low demand, a slowdown in accumulation and productivity,  and low growth and 
fewer or bad quality jobs both in the UK and Europe (Tori and Onaran, 2015; Onaran and Obst, 
2015). The empirical evidence shows that to break this vicious circle we need alternative 
economic policies based on a coordinated policy mix of equality-led development and public 
investment.  
The strategy of a wage-led development requires labour market policies aiming at pre-
distribution as well as redistribution. These include strengthening the bargaining power of 
labour, ensuring higher collective bargaining coverage, increasing the statutory minimum wage 
to the level of a living wage, enforcing gender equality, introducing and enforcing pay ratios to 
moderate wage inequality, restoring the progressivity of the tax system, and ending public sector 
pay freezes. Furthermore, income distribution policies need to be embedded into a broader 
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macroeconomic and industrial policy mix targeting equality, full employment, and ecological 
sustainability. This requires regulating finance and implementing a public investment 
programme centred on substantial public investment in green physical infrastructure in 
renewable energy, public transport and housing and social infrastructure in care, education, and 
health. Free movement of labour in this context can only positively contribute to the local 
communities, and an appropriate public infrastructure ensures that there is an adequate supply of 
health, education and care services and housing in a vibrant community.  
Labour market policy is not the only issue where working people in the UK need to 
coordinate with the progressive forces in Europe. We should not let the Brexit vote to stand in 
the way of international cooperation. As part of a European alliance, we can work for financial 
regulation, tax coordination, ecological sustainability and implement a coordinated public 
investment policy far better than we could on our own. The UK labour movement needs to 
coordinate with European labour movements to push for more coordination of investment, social 
and labour market policies and regulation of capital markets.      
 
 
 
 
8 
 
Figure 1 
 
Source: See Guschanski and Onaran (2016, forthcoming) for data sources.  
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Figure 2  
 
Source: See Guschanski and Onaran (2016, forthcoming) for data sources. 
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Appendix Table 1: Estimation results for the wage share in the UK  
  Within Estimator First Difference Estimator 
 GBR_1 GBR_2 GBR_3 GBR_4 GBR_5 GBR_6 GBR_7 GBR_8 GBR_1 GBR_2 GBR_3 GBR_4 GBR_5 GBR_6 GBR_7 GBR_8 
growth -0.341** -0.380** -0.333** -0.264** -0.265** -0.275** -0.125* -0.117 -0.154*** -0.153*** -0.160*** -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.238*** -0.073 -0.073 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.098) (0.114) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.245) (0.256) 
capital stock_t-1 0.118** 0.114*** 0.130**      0.185*** 0.189*** 0.196***      
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.012)      (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)      
int. imports_t-1 -0.197 -0.259 -0.113      -0.254 -0.237 -0.230*      
 (0.464) (0.330) (0.622)      (0.101) (0.118) (0.111)      
other imports_t-1 0.114*** 0.044 0.143***      0.032 0.038 0.041      
 (0.005) (0.399) (0.004)      (0.477) (0.407) (0.351)      
social 
government_t-1 
 0.020**   0.001  0.020* 0.018*  -0.005   -0.006  0.002 0.002 
  (0.010)   (0.801)  (0.052) (0.061)  (0.498)   (0.400)  (0.920) (0.927) 
bargaining cov_t-1   0.003   0.003*     0.005**   0.001   
   (0.123)   (0.079)     (0.012)   (0.392)   
ICT capital_t-1    -0.001 -0.002 0.019** -0.012 -0.019    0.016 0.019 0.024 0.030 0.031 
    (0.865) (0.802) (0.045) (0.706) (0.584)    (0.292) (0.224) (0.143) (0.481) (0.392) 
non-ICT capital_t-1    -0.033 -0.033 -0.062 0.058 0.064    0.110* 0.112* 0.099* 0.027 0.026 
    (0.449) (0.447) (0.202) (0.296) (0.270)    (0.070) (0.067) (0.100) (0.764) (0.752) 
outward FDI_t-1    0.097 0.094 0.107 -0.125** -0.118**    -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 -0.069 -0.070 
    (0.557) (0.578) (0.520) (0.017) (0.020)    (0.943) (0.937) (0.966) (0.418) (0.438) 
hh debt_t-1       -0.283*** -0.268***       -0.226 -0.226 
       (0.004) (0.002)       (0.210) (0.209) 
fin. income_t-1       0.030* 0.020***       0.023* 0.023* 
       (0.055) (0.001)       (0.079) (0.093) 
fin. payments_t-1       -0.102*** -0.103***       -0.089* -0.089** 
       (0.000) (0.000)       (0.052) (0.042) 
migration_t-1       1.425*** 2.080***       1.436* 1.403* 
       (0.000) (0.000)       (0.072) (0.085) 
gini_t-1        -0.008**        0.001 
        (0.028)        (0.945) 
constant 0.626*** 0.454*** 0.493*** 0.501** 0.478* 0.350 1.873*** 2.062***         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.065) (0.207) (0.000) (0.000)         
withR2 0.208 0.248 0.225 0.077 0.077 0.106 0.092 0.097 0.087 0.084 0.116 0.093 0.093 0.092 0.011 0.001 
F-test 11.944 10.223 10.797 5.476 6.224 5.228 5561.640 1071.984 4.783 3.699 4.957 4.756 3.899 3.872 1.567 1.463 
obs 182 182 182 266 266 266 132 132 169 169 169 247 247 247 114 114 
number of sectors 11 11 11 18 18 18 18 18 11 11 11 18 18 18 17 17 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within sector wage share. Estimation period is 1988-2008. All estimations exclude Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and 
Mining and Quarrying sectors as well as public sectors (Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work 
Activities). Estimation methods in column titles. P-values below the estimation coefficients in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. Source: See Guschanski and Onaran (2016, forthcoming) for data sources. The estimations for separate sector and skill groups are available upon request.  
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Appendix Table 2 
Dependent variable: Average labour compensation in the UK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
growth 1.060 1.064 12.988** 13.684** 
 (0.891) (0.712) (0.027) (0.021) 
capital stock_t-1 -0.176    
 (0.962)    
int. imports_t-1 3.266    
 (0.796)    
other imports_t-1 14.410***    
 (0.001)    
social government_t-1 3.639*** 2.334*** 1.103 0.870 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.292) (0.398) 
ICT capital_t-1  1.594*** -10.578*** -11.150*** 
  (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
non-ICT capital_t-1  -17.071*** 2.914 3.474 
  (0.000) (0.346) (0.281) 
outward FDI_t-1  49.129*** 19.148** 19.344** 
  (0.000) (0.022) (0.021) 
hh debt_t-1   17.146** 18.304** 
   (0.027) (0.017) 
fin. income_t-1   3.540*** 2.734*** 
   (0.003) (0.000) 
fin. payments_t-1   -5.117*** -5.294*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
migration_t-1   88.969*** 146.114*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
gini_t-1    -0.689*** 
    (0.001) 
constant -17.252* -82.766*** -104.494*** -87.409*** 
 (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
withR2 0.483 0.711 0.689 0.691 
F-test 148.981 390.489 2286.033 1652.401 
obs 184 265 125 125 
number of sectors 11 18 18 18 
Notes: The dependent variable is the within sector average labour compensation in the UK as a ratio to total people 
engaged, adjusting for the labour income of the self-employed. Estimation period is 1988-2008. All estimations 
exclude Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing; and Mining and Quarrying sectors as well as public sectors 
(Public Administration and Defence; Compulsory Social Security; Education; Human Health and Social Work 
Activities). The estimation method is the within-estimator with standard errors robust to serial correlation within 
sectors, cross-sectional correlation between sectors as well as general heteroscedasticity. P-values below the 
estimation coefficients in parenthesis. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. See Guschanski and Onaran (2016, forthcoming) for data sources. The estimations for separate sector 
and skill groups are available upon request.   
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